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Abstract 
A longstanding critique of the European Union has been its ‘hydra-headed’ external representation 
whereby multiple EU actors intervene to speak on the Union’s behalf in international organizations. 
Expectations were therefore raised as the 2009 Lisbon Treaty created a simplified regime of external 
representation whereby in essence the representation is left in the hands of the President of the 
European Council, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and 
Vice-President of the European Commission and, finally, the President of the Commission. The 
question explored in this Working Paper is whether the 2009 Lisbon Treaty reform has since given rise 
to that cohesion and clarity of expression ("single voice") for which the EU and its member states 
allegedly strives. We survey this topic by ways of the EU´s external representation in the United 
Nations system and related conferences. Our main findings are that while it can be said that the ‘new’ 
troika has gained in formal representative ‘authority’, it has not been accompanied by greater 
independence of action or ‘autonomy’ from member states or by significant gains in terms of overall 
simplification of the Union’s external representation so far. 
Keywords 
EU external representation, Lisbon Treaty, UN system, single voice, ‘authority’, ‘autonomy’. 
 1 
Introduction* 
When Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European Council, took the stand at the opening session 
of the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN) in September 2011, his action was qualified as 
doubly “symbolic” by media.1 On the one hand, it was the first time in UN history that a representative 
of a regional organization was allowed to address the plenary, as this had traditionally been a right 
reserved only for Heads of State or Government. Hence Van Rompuy’s speech was interpreted as a 
recognition of sorts of the international stature that the European Union (EU) has acquired in recent 
decades. On the other hand, Van Rompuy’s address to the General Assembly appeared as a symbolic 
step forward towards achieving the Union’s longstanding ambition that it should speak with a ‘single 
voice’ in the United Nations system and before the international community at large. This has been a 
European objective since the very beginning of European Political Cooperation (EPC) in the 1970s.
2
 
Symbolism aside, the appearance of the President of the European Council at the inaugural session 
of the General Assembly in representation of the EU is perhaps one of the most visible novelties 
introduced by the 2009 Lisbon Treaty. The Treaty expresses the member states’ desire to simplify the 
Union’s external representation and adopts a number of reforms in this regard. It is believed that 
through these new measures the EU will become more effective in the framework of foreign policy 
and acquire an enhanced ability “to communicate more clearly with its international partners” in 
different international forums.
3
  
This working paper takes these objectives as its starting point. The question that we intend to 
explore is whether the Treaty reform of the EU's external representation has permitted simplification 
and given rise to that clarity of expression (‘voice’) which the EU and its member states allegedly 
strive for. Stated differently, has the Lisbon Treaty enabled the EU to definitively put paid to the 
persistent image of being ‘polycephalous’ or ‘hydra-headedness’ in its external representation?4 The 
working paper is structured as follow: the first section gives a brief introduction to the dynamics of the 
pre-Lisbon EU external representation. The second section outlines the concepts used for analysis in 
this text. The third section will explore the most significant changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty 
in terms of the EU's external representation as well as the political practice that has developed since 
the entry into force of the Treaty in December 2009. The fourth and final section examines the 
implications for the ‘authority’ and ‘autonomy’ of the EU's external representation on policy and 
practice. 
                                                     
*
 The author is member of the Observatory of European Foreign Policy. This is a translated and updated version of 
Elisabeth Johansson-Nogués “La representación exterior de la UE, a la hora de Lisboa,” in Esther Barbé (ed.) Cambio 
mundial y gobernanza global: la interacción entre la Unión Europea y las instituciones internacionales. Madrid: Tecnos, 
2012. 
1
 “Poker With UN Votes: Europe Divided on Palestinian Question”, Spiegel Online, 22 September 2011. 
2
 Nuttall, S. “Two Decades of EPC Performance,” in E. Regelsberger et al. (eds.), Foreign Policy of the European Union: 
From EPC to CFSP and beyond, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1997. 
3
 European Union, Treaty on European Union (TEU), on-line resource. 
4
 Jørgensen, K.E. “The European Union in Multilateral Diplomacy”, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy vol. 4, 2009, pp. 
189-209; Kozak, T. “Multi-headed foreign representation”, Opinion, EUObserver, 19 June 2003; Duke, S., “Providing 
for European-Level Diplomacy after Lisbon: the Case of the European External Action Service”, The Hague Journal of 
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The EU’s external representation prior to Lisbon 
The Six’ external representation towards third countries or multilateral organizations was not 
contemplated by the Treaty of Rome in 1957. However, after the creation of European Political 
Cooperation in 1970 the representative function was informally assumed by the rotating Presidency of 
the Council of Ministers.
5
 Given the lack of clear rules in regards to this function, each six-month 
Presidency in the early years of EPC would subsequently handle the external representation function 
according to their own capacity (infrastructure and diplomatic skills), their resources and their political 
ambition. This inevitably caused a great heterogeneity between different Presidencies-in-office and as 
a consequence the EC introduced the mechanism of the so-called ‘troika’ in the 1980s in order to 
ensure greater continuity in the external representation. Through the troika, the sitting Presidency 
formally exercised representation in the field of EPC in summits with third countries or international 
organizations, together with the preceding and succeeding Presidency.
6
 The European Commission, on 
its hand, developed a strong presence in international forums in areas of its competence or through 
interagency agreements that allowed the Commission to act as an observer or in parallel with the EU 
member states. 
The Maastricht Treaty codified the practice of the separate representation of the Union and of the 
European Community. Hence Article J.5.1 of the Maastricht Treaty stated that the rotating Presidency 
of the Council shall represent the EU's common foreign and security policy, while the European 
Commission play this role in the frame of its competences with an international dimension such as, for 
example, trade or agriculture.
7
 In terms of the UN, this provision meant that the EU Presidency-in-
office would present the Union’s priorities during his/her speech before the plenary of the General 
Assembly and/or act as the coordinator of the European position through its delegation in New York, 
Geneva and Vienna. The rotating Presidency would also represent the common position of the EU in 
all UN organs and specialized agencies, in its multiple levels of work, during the six month duration of 
the Presidency. The European Commission, meanwhile, would provide the necessary legal personality 
for the EU activity and exercise its own function of external representation in those areas where 
having acquired such rights (for example, in the United Nations Organization for Food and 
Agriculture or the International Atomic Energy Agency).
8
 
The codification of the figure of the Presidency in the external representation in the Maastricht 
Treaty did, however, not resolve the underlying problem. There was still a lingering perception that 
not all the Presidencies were able to perform the job effectively and satisfactorily given the complex 
logistics and workload related to the position, in general, and, in particular, with regard to the 
coordination of the EU in the headquarters of the UN and other multilateral organizations. Another 
problem that arose with the Maastricht Treaty was the creation of so-called ‘variable geometry’ or 
‘multi-speed Europe,’ which implied that the Presidency-in-office could not always represent the 
European position in international forums, if it was not a participant of that particular policy. In this 
regard it should be noted, for example, the inability of Denmark or Ireland to decide on policies 
related to the field of defense during their periods at the helm of the EU.
9
 These, and other problems, 
were the reasons why the Treaty of Amsterdam amended the troika, which, from 1999 onwards, came 
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to be composed of the sitting and outgoing Presidency, along with the High Representative for the 
CFSP (a post which was created with the Treaty of Amsterdam), in the area of common foreign and 
security policy, and/or the European Commission on issues falling in the latter’s areas of competence. 
As of the Treaty of Nice, the current President could choose to voluntarily give up the external 
representation to the EU High Representative.
10
 
Despite the reforms of Amsterdam and Nice, the EU’s byzantine external representation system 
continued to generate considerable frustration among third countries and inside the halls of 
multilateral forums. Apart from the fact that the EU Presidency changed every six month, each EU 
Presidency also called upon the other members of the troika differently, some Presidencies frequently 
requesting assistance with representation while other not. As a consequence the EU’s external 
representation came to be seen as less than transparent for most of its international partners. Finally, 
the ability of some Presidencies to speak on behalf of the EU-15 in a credible way before a global 
audience continued to be challenged, especially when it came to the smaller member states. Thus, the 
EU’s foreign policy, according to an analysis by the European Commission, had reached a point in the 
early 2000s where it had become “weakened” by the persistent “lack of focus and continuity in the 
external representation.”11 
The criticism of the complexities of the EU external representation motivated members of the 
Convention on the Future of Europe (drafters of the failed European Constitution and of, in its 
modified version, the Treaty of Lisbon) to propose a step forward, towards simplification and greater 
consistency in this area.
12
 Hence in the text of the European Constitution in 2004 and the Lisbon 
Treaty the role of the six-month Presidencies in the Union’s external representation is phased out. 
Instead alternative options for external representation were contemplated. The first option is the 
President of the European Council, exercising the Union’s external representation in meetings at the 
level of Heads of State and Government.
13
 The second option is the High Representative of the Union 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission, Catherine 
Ashton, whom the Treaty gives a representative role in matters related to foreign policy at ministerial 
level in bi- or multilateral contexts.
14
 The third option is the European Commission, who, according to 
Article 17 (TEU), may represent the EU in all areas, except in foreign policy, security and defense.
15
 
The external representation of the EU in the Lisbon Treaty thus falls into the hands of a ‘new troika’ 
composed exclusively of European ‘supra-state’ or institutional actors and each furbished with a 
pluriannual mandate to exercise their external representation function. 
A conceptual approximation to the EU external representation 
It is worth noting that between the failure of the European Constitution and the agreement on a 
political solution in the form of the Lisbon Treaty there was an important temporal lapse. Thus, the 
tenuous situation of the EU external representation based on Amsterdam and Nice lasted almost a 
decade. Given the absence of simplified guidelines for the external representation, a major loophole 
was created and over the years the void was filled with informal political practice. It consolidated a 
particular political modus vivendi around the external representation which could be classified with 
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the help of the following three models proposed by Jørgensen, namely: (1) the unconditional 
delegation model, (2) supervised delegation model and (3) the coordination model.
16
 
"Unconditional delegation" can be described as a modality under which the representation is 
exclusively held by an EU institutional actor by virtue of its Treaty competences. The member states 
fully respect this competence, delegating the corresponding representation, political power and 
initiative taking. However, this model, as Jørgensen argues, practically only applies on determined 
intra-Union matters. It is almost never used in the international context with the exception of specific 
cases related to, for example, aspect of competition policy in the World Trade Organization (WTO) or 
the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO).
17
 The second dimension corresponds to the 
‘supervised delegation model.’ Jørgensen highlights that this model is pertinent to mixed competence 
situations where member states delegate authority and representation to the Presidency, the 
Commission and/or the High Representative, but under the supervision by the member states. The 
member states’ supervision can take the form of a Council's mandate, which determines the 
parameters of the negotiation through its ability to reject the agreement, or through a constant 
monitoring of negotiating activity by the EU-28 individually. Another common form of monitoring is 
the choice of joint representation, which implies that the external representation is shared between the 
Commission and different member countries constellations.
18
 This model is most often used in the 
context of multilateral negotiations for international agreements not related to foreign or security 
policy, as in the case of some environmental agreements, development or commercial policy. Finally, 
the ‘coordination model,’ the most used according to Jørgensen, refers to a modality under which 
competences are mixed, but in this case, the external representation is in the hands of member states 
representing the EU through the Presidency or, if possible, through national delegations in forums to 
which not all member states have access.
19
 In these situations, the final decision on the representation 
is taken ad hoc and almost always subject to context.
20
 In the pre-Lisbon era the coordination model 
was used in forums such as the General Assembly or multilateral treaties and bodies linked to the 
global organization such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the 
Human Rights Council and the World Health Organization. Occasionally representatives of the 
European institutions were invited by the Presidency to share the representation or participate in the 
EU delegation headed by the Presidency.
21
 In sum, despite the formal division of powers as provided 
in the Treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice in terms of exclusive or shared competences, in 
practice, states members and European institutions have developed a political modus vivendi based on 
intense interaction (in the form of supervision or coordination models) in regards to most aspects of 
the EU representation in multilateral organizations or other entities.
22
 
Before we go on to assess the EU's post-Lisbon external representation, it is necessary to 
emphasize two additional analytical concepts – ‘authority’ and ‘autonomy.’ Authority refers to the 
rights and powers granted to the central organ (agent) of an organization or institution by the members 
                                                     
16
 Jørgensen, op. cit. 
17
 Ibid. The author provides examples such as the European Commission WTO action on cases such as the Boeing-
McDonnell Douglas, Microsoft or GE-Honeywell. 
18
 In some scenarios the Commission co-represented the EU together with one of the Presidencies and/or several other 
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19
 Jørgensen, op. cit.; Kaczyński, P.M., “Swimming in Murky Waters: Challenges in Developing the EU’s External 
Representation”, FIIA Briefing Paper 88, Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Helsinki, September 2011. 
20
 One example would be FAO where the EC/EU and the member states declare at the beginning of the session who has the 
competency pronounce itself and on which specific points of the agenda. Emerson, M. y Kaczyński, P., “Looking afresh 
at the external representation of the EU in the international arena, post-Lisbon”, CEPS Policy Brief 212, Center for 
European Policy Studies, Brussels, July 2010. 
21
 In the UN-system the European Commission has subscribed to agreements which allows them to act alongside the 
member states, e.g. in the WTO or FAO.  
22
 Jørgensen, op. cit. 
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(principals) in order for the former to be able to interact and/or negotiate with third entities (states or 
organizations) effectively.
23
 The authority can be thought of as political and/or legal authority. In this 
text we conceive of the agent as referring to representatives of European institutions and the principals 
being EU member states. Autonomy, on its hand, refers to freedom of action enjoyed by the agent in 
relation to its principals and where the agent is granted the status of an actor in its own right alongside 
the principals. Jupille and Caporaso argue that autonomy entails a salient “corporate” actor more than 
a mere “collective,” given that the corporate actor plays a role that is “more than the sum of its 
constituent parts.”24 Thus, autonomy exists when there is a clear operative differentiation between the 
EU and its member states facilitated by the legal frameworks and/or by a political practice. The 
autonomy of the agent may increase when there is leeway of decision-making in broad terms, when 
the decision-making process escapes the standard operating procedures as the instructions are 
ambiguous, incomplete or when the agent rely on key information to which it have privileged access.
25
 
The autonomy of the agent decreases when these conditions are not met. 
Prior to 2009 we can consider the European institutional actors’ authority over the Union’s external 
representation in multilateral forums as moderate. The codification of the role of the Commission in 
the Maastricht Treaty and the reform of the troika from Amsterdam provided a strong legal basis for 
the Commission and the High Representative in representing the EU together with the Presidency. 
However, this formal authority did not translate into real autonomy for the EU institutional actors. 
Rather the member states have instead intensified their control over the representative role of the 
European institutions in the past decade by ways of the supervised delegation model. Moreover, the 
extensive reliance on the coordination model gave the Presidency great prominence in the external 
representation of the EU. However, it came at the cost of the other actors in the troika and of the 
overall coherence in the Union’s external representation. In sum, although the various treaty reforms 
have given more authority to the agent in terms of external representation, the political practice that 
developed prior to the Lisbon Treaty meant that the authority did not translate into autonomy. 
The EU’s external representation after Lisbon 
In light of the above, when the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force in 2009 the question was whether 
the simplifications introduced in the Treaty would mean the beginning to the end of hydra-headed 
confusion surrounding the external representation of the EU as well as more authority and autonomy 
to EU institutional actors.
26
 The Treaty endows the EU with legal personality
27
 and, as mentioned 
already, the six-monthly presidency is displaced by a new troika: the President of the European 
Council, the High Representative and the European Commission. Hence, on paper, the Lisbon Treaty 
gives the impression that the EU is on the verge of becoming simplified, more cohesive and 
transparent with regard to its external representation and thus potentially more able to communicate 
clearly with its international partners. However, the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty has been 
anything but simple. Many questions are still raised about the actors designated to exercise the 
external representation of the EU, as well as their duties, as we will see in continuation.  
First, the European Council's decision to appoint Herman Van Rompuy and Catherine Ashton as 
President of the European Council and High Representative/Vice-President of the European 
Commission, respectively, became the first hurdle for the Union’s external representation even before 
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 Jupille, J. y Caporaso, J.A., “States, Agency and Rules: the European Union in Global Environmental Politics”, in C. 
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 Ibid. 
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27
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the entry into force of the Treaty. The appointment of Van Rompuy and Ashton was certainly a 
surprise to many, even to most in the Brussels-circuits. Some in the media and others in the European 
Parliament wondered how two hitherto relatively unknown politicians were appointed to positions of 
such prominence.
28
 Yet other analysts were concerned that Van Rompuy and Ashton’s lack of political 
stature would hinder the successful implementation of their obligations. Hence the dual test of Van 
Rompuy and Ashton in the early months was, in the words of one observer, the rise to the dual 
“challenge to become the face and voice of Europe in the world,” as well as become known “on their 
own continent.”29 With hindsight it is clear that the controversy surrounding the appointment of Van 
Rompuy and Ashton militated to a certain degree against the rapid consolidation of these offices as 
true and legitimate representatives of the EU both in the eyes of member states and third countries. 
Another element that did not facilitate the consolidation process of the “new” troika was the absence 
of the High Representative during her first year in office in some situations or international forums, in 
which she was expected to represent the EU. The reasons for such absences could surely be justified 
for reasons of clashing schedule and perhaps even the fact that “the responsibilities attached to the post 
of the HR/VP appear too challenging for a single individual to fulfill”.30 Still, experts note that all 
officials mark the institutional possibilities and limits of their office in the first years and hence 
consistent presence is of importance for this reason.
31
 The decision of the High Representative to not 
attend a conference in Montreal in 2010 organized to coordinate international aid to Haiti following 
the earthquake that hit the Caribbean country, for example, was criticized on this basis.
32
 Since the 
entry of force of the Lisbon Treaty, the High Representative’s absences on numerous occasions have 
thus been seen as not helpful in terms of shaping the functions of the external representation of the 
EU. 
Second, controversy also emerged around another member of the new troika, this time the 
European Commission and its interpretation of the Commission’s refurbished role in the post-Lisbon 
external representation. The European Commission, under Article 17 of the Treaty, assumes the 
external representation of the EU in all areas, except foreign policy, security and defense.
33
 This 
created the expectation that the Commission would, for example, exercise the representation of the EU 
in the UN Conference on Climate Change in Copenhagen (COP-17) in 2010, just weeks after the entry 
into force of the Treaty. However, the Council considered it desirable that the external representation 
in Copenhagen should be performed by the rotating Presidency (Sweden), in collaboration with the 
European Commission and in partnership with the incoming Presidency (Spain) plus some member 
states with particular interest in the subject.
34
 The result was, in the opinion of a member of the 
European Parliament, “a disaster” because the EU had “six or seven prime ministers trying to speak on 
behalf of Europe.”35 In a similar case, only months later the European Commission offered itself as the 
chief negotiator for the 2010 United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) conference in Stockholm 
which sought to agree on a global instrument on the use of mercury. The Commission's offer was 
again rejected by the Council as some member states did not appear to be prepared to give full powers 
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 Andrew Duff, MPE, in Rankin, J., “Row over who gets to take charge at environment talks,” European Voice, 15 April 
2010.  
The European Union’s external representation after Lisbon: from ‘hydra-headed’ to ‘octopus’? 
7 
to a delegation led by the Commission.
36
 This reluctance is due to some member states’ perception, 
according to one source, that the Commission as a negotiator might not adequately safeguard the 
member states’ interests in good faith and/or would fail to circulate the information on the state of the 
negotiations to the required level.
37
 The Commission, finding itself once more rejected to exercise the 
external representation, retaliated this time by withdrawing its UNEP draft mercury negotiating 
mandate and, consequently, the member states were not able to act in a coordinated manner at the 
UNEP negotiation table in the Swedish capital.
38
 The Commission afterwards expressed its 
willingness to take the case to the European Court of Justice. However, in December 2010 the problem 
was settled by a decision of the Council to recognize the right of the Commission to represent the EU 
on mercury whenever related to its competences. However, the condition imposed was that the 
Commission could only exercise its representation rights in international negotiations after due 
consultation with a special committee composed of member states.
39
 In addition, there should be close 
cooperation between the Commission and the member states throughout the negotiation and the 
Council reserves its rights to revisit the initial negotiating mandate. Incidents such as Copenhagen and 
Stockholm indicate that the Lisbon Treaty did not manage to solve all issues related to the external 
representation. A number of inter-institutional battles between the Commission and the Council over 
how to interpret the legal texts on external representation in specific situations have instead ensued.  
Third, the disappearance of the role of the six-monthly Presidency in external representation as of 
the Lisbon Treaty soon became another source of controversy. While some states welcome the new 
troika representing the EU in international forums, other states would have liked to see a continued 
role of the EU Presidency in the external representation.
40
 Those who advocate for a continued 
prominent role of the Presidency in the post-Lisbon era argue that in situations of mixed competences 
the external representation must be exercised by the Council Presidency. This was the argument, for 
example, put forward by Hungary in the context of the preparation of the climate change conference in 
Cancun in 2010, which claimed the right to exercise the external representation during its then 
incoming six-month presidency.
41
 The Polish Presidency (second half 2011) also called for a 
continued international role for the EU Presidency.
42
 
The Hungarian-Polish view contrasted with the Belgian vision during its semester at the helm of 
the Council (second half of 2010).
43
 Belgium, observers note, supported the new troika to create a 
precedent in the interpretation of the Treaty.
44
 An example is the A/64/L67 draft Resolution on EU's 
participation in the work of United Nations. The draft presented by the Belgian Presidency in 
September 2010 makes clear that the Lisbon Treaty resolves the external representation the EU in 
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favor of the new troika composed of European institutional actors, and that these three actors 
substitutes the role previously played by the member state holding the Presidency. European players, 
in other words, assume the representation on behalf of the EU and member states as a whole. 
The post-Lisbon external representation of the EU in international thus still generates considerable 
confusion and even some tension between member states and the European actors explicitly 
designated by the Treaty to carry out that purpose.
45
 Some of the arguments seem petty, on the 
superficial level, because they focus on protocol details like nameplates (European Union or EU 
Presidency), speaking order, allotments of speaking time and even hierarchical organization of chairs 
at the table of the delegation.
46
 However, on a deeper level, they reveal the fundamental problem of 
the distribution of power within the EU which remains largely intact since the Treaty of Nice. Thus the 
gap between the simplified external representation and distribution of powers in mid-2011 led to the 
demand for a new political modus vivendi. 
The need for a new political deal came to its hilt as member states began to fear that the allocation 
of powers in the post-Lisbon external representation may cause a reinterpretation and/or extension of 
powers in favor of the European actors and the European institutions and to the detriment of the 
member states. The British Foreign and Commonwealth Office expresses this concern as a 
“representation creep” which might eventually become a “competence creep.”47 The member states in 
other words sought to avoid an adjustment in the institutional balance of power in favor of Brussels 
and the European institutions. Wouters and Ramapoulos dispute this vision arguing that “it is doubtful 
that a unified representation of the Union and its Member States in an IO can be considered legally to 
constitute an ‘exercise’ on behalf of the Union of its shared competence.” Furthermore, they sustain 
the “mere practice in an IO cannot change the allocation of competences enshrined in the EU 
Treaties.”48 Still, the unsettled situation lead to that, in October 2011 and after months of arduous talks 
among member states, the Legal Service of the Council and the European Commission, a 
memorandum outlining the first additional criteria on how to interpret the external representation of 
the EU was adopted.
49
  
The memorandum represented a first step to generate more clarity and offer guidelines to European 
action and can be summarized in three points.
50
 First, the member states will agree on a case by case 
basis whether and how to coordinate and be represented externally. The member states may ask the 
new post-Lisbon troika or the sitting EU Presidency to represent them.
51
 Second, states will seek to 
ensure and promote possibilities for the new troika to make statements on behalf of the EU. To this 
end, the member states and the new troika will coordinate their action in international organizations as 
much as possible, along the lines the Treaty calls for. The new troika will also ensure maximum 
transparency through adequate and timely consultation on statements reflecting the position of the EU 
in multilateral organizations. The member states may complement declarations made by the EU actors, 
while respecting the principle of sincere cooperation. The representation shall be exercised from 
behind the nameplate of the EU except in cases where the rules of the forum in question prevent such 
practices.
52
 Third, and finally, the external representation does not affect the distribution of 
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competences agreed to by the Treaties nor can the issue of representation be evoked to acquire new 
ones. Hence, the EU institutional actors can only make statements related to cases over which it has 
jurisdiction and when there is an agreed common position, following the provisions of the Treaty. 
Moreover, the EU representation does not affect the normal procedures of decision-making common 
positions required by the Treaties.
53
 The latter safeguards are very much in line with the claims made 
in particular from the British government during the 2007 Intergovernmental Conference which gave 
life to the reformed Lisbon Treaty. London wants above all to ensure that the representative role of the 
High Representative in any way not condition the full freedom of action for the United Kingdom in 
multilateral forums, in particular the UN Security Council.
54
 
In sum, the EU’s enhanced legal personality and external representation by the European supra-
state actors in the wake of the Lisbon Treaty do not substantially alter the intergovernmental nature of 
the EU's external action, or imply a fundamental change in “the political balance between the states 
members and the Union.”55 In many areas of external action of the EU, member states retain their full 
right to define the rules of representation in international forums on a case by case basis because these 
are areas of exclusive or shared jurisdiction.
56
 However, the November memorandum does timidly 
open the door to a possible increased use of the new troika in multilateral contexts, in particular in the 
United Nations system. The failure of Copenhagen and Stockholm were powerful signs of the 
weakness of the Europeans, when they do not speak with one voice. Hence in the coming years is 
likely that the new troika will assume a more prominent role in the international representation of the 
EU, but always under keen micromanagement, close monitoring and certainly under some form of co-
representation, by the member states. 
From "Hydra-Headed" to "Octopus"? 
The image of the EU as ‘polycephalous’57 or ‘hydra-headed’58 in terms of its multi-headed external 
representation is persistent in the academic literature.
59
 In a recent reflection on the EU in the 
Caucasus, Babayan and Shapovalova argue that the Lisbon reform of the external representation can 
be understood as a simple a metamorphosis of that which already existed into a new physical form.
60
 
Thus, it is argued that although the Lisbon Treaty has achieved (tacit) agreement on the new troika, the 
inconsistency in the external representation now manifest itself at the lower levels of the European 
structure. The same authors therefore hold that the EU today is better described as an “octopus” with a 
single head but with many limbs moving in different directions. This image serves as a starting point 
for our discussion, in terms of authority and autonomy, on the reforms introduced by Lisbon in 
external representation in relation to the UN-system. 
In terms of authority, as we have seen, the new troika composed of EU institutional actors gained 
legal authority in terms of the external representation. Compared to the previous situation, Lisbon has 
indeed managed to simplify the external representation on paper and thus, the new troika has a 
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formally recognized role. Also, the spirit of the memorandum prepared under the Polish Presidency 
seems to tilt the institutional balance in relation to the external representation in favor of increased use 
of the EU actors as far as possible. The task of representation in the General Assembly is now 
effectively in the hands of the new troika and coordination will be provided by the EU Delegation in 
New York. However, there are still many areas in the United Nations system and related conferences 
for which the member states still will have to work out case by case whether to be represented by the 
new troika or through other formulas. Thus, one could argue that, after Lisbon, the external 
representation of the EU at the UN has gone from relying extensively on the coordination model to be 
a model of governance that is equally split between the supervised delegation model and the 
coordination model or even greater use of supervised delegation, according to Jørgensen parameters. 
So the idea is gaining ground that perhaps in a growing number of areas EU we have a few "heads” 
less when it comes to EU’s notoriously polycephalous external representation. In some contexts it is 
even consistently represented by a single head, like the case of the inaugural UNGA session referred 
to in the Introduction. 
However, there are still many areas that are grey areas or red lines for some EU member states 
when it comes to the EU’s external representation. Thus, in terms of autonomy, it could be argued that 
somewhat paradoxically that while the agent has gained some authority it has lost autonomy. The 
greater authority of EU actors in the external representation has been gained at the cost of permitting 
the principals the right to exercise greater supervision of the agent. Kaczynski, for example, sustains 
that member states are increasingly more likely to attach long list of restrictions to the international 
negotiating mandate in terms of the objectives and how to achieve them thereby limiting the freedom 
of action of the EU actors.
61
 In sum, much as the Lisbon Treaty has given prominence to European 
institutional actors in the external representation, in practice, the representative role has not been 
endowed with autonomy or real political power. These constraints correspond to those outlined in 
relation to Jørgensen supervision model. The representatives of the EU, put in another way, only 
represent the EU through their physical presence, but limited in its action beyond being a mere 
spokesperson for the member states. Van Rompuy’s speeches to the General Assembly inaugural 
sessions each year is a clear example of representation without ability to express an autonomous 
discourse, a fact that was not lost on the audience.
62
 In other words, returning to our octopus allegory, 
much as in some contexts, as we have noted above, there is a single head, this head has no separate 
autonomy away from its limbs. 
In the pre- and post-Lisbon external representation there is thus a clear continuity in terms of 
political practice. The underlying problem seems to be a lack of confidence of some member states in 
the EU institutions. The reluctance of many member states to let EU actors acquire a too prominent 
role shows their distrust of the new troika to adequately carry out the external representation on their 
behalf.
63
 The drawback with such distrust, Jørgensen has noted, is the continued cacophony and 
ineffectiveness of the European Union effectively reducing the influence corresponding to its 
international presence.
64
 Other authors echo this assessment. Thus, as Sanchez Barrueco notes, that it 
may seem advantageous to share representation and leadership between different stakeholders, like 
between the new troika and interested member states. However, if such leadership is decided ad hoc it 
continues to generate uncertainty both within and outside the EU for the resulting lack of transparency 
and predictability.
65
 In other words, in spite of an attempt to institutional innovation, the Lisbon Treaty 
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does not seem to have altered the dynamics in the EU’s external representation significantly. The near 
to medium future therefore appears to point to the continuation of ineffective governance in external 
representation. The Lisbon Treaty’s ambition of clarity and single voice seem in consequence appears 
to remain a mere aspiration for the time being.
66
 
Conclusions 
The Lisbon Treaty attempted to introduce significant reforms to clarify and simplify the EU’s external 
representation. For this, the Treaty formally eliminates the role of the Presidency in the EU's 
international representation and proposes instead a new troika composed of the President of the 
European Council, the High Representative and the Commission. A strictly legal reading of the Treaty 
would give the impression of an institutional balance tilt to the side of the post-Lisbon troika when 
representing the EU and its member states in international forums. In the words of Jupille and 
Caporaso, one could say that the Lisbon Treaty has given more authority to the European institutions 
in the external representation. 
However, as much as the Treaty granted authority to the new troika, the question of autonomy is 
much more slippery and here the analysis can only be made case by case and over time. What is clear, 
for now, is that the EU representatives do not enjoy significant autonomy with respect to the member 
states. 
In sum, it is not clear that the post-Lisbon stage represents an improvement of the functioning of 
the external representation or that it provides the single voice which the Union and its member states 
allegedly aim for. The reluctance of member states appears to be the major obstacle to the rapid 
consolidation of clarity of expression by the EU on the international scene. The road ahead for the new 
troika is certainly to attempt to gradually gain the confidence of the member states. Duke has noted 
that the experience from the six-monthly Presidencies reveals that the effectiveness and success of 
these almost always depended on the power of persuasion that the Presidency exercised.
67
 According 
to this logic then perhaps, the post-Lisbon troika will have to deploy medium-and long -term capacity 
for dialogue and to join forces so that their external representation function is more than a mere 
formality devoid of voice. 
  
(Contd.)                                                                  
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